The aim of this paper is to establish the effect of on-the-job-training and university education on the firm's innovation decision in transition economies of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. We use the 2002 and 2005 waves of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys. Our findings, based on a mixed discrete-continuous model with endogenous variables in the firm's innovation equation, suggest that further investments in education will not lead to necessary improvements in the firm's demonstrated ability to innovate. This is in contrast to on-the-job-training, which we find increases a firm's ability to innovate in countries with transition economies.
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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to establish the effect of human capital on the firm's innovation decision in transition economies of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union 3 . Specifically, we provide the theoretical model by explicitly incorporating the effect of on-the-job-training and university education on the firm's innovation decision. Within the context of this model, we empirically test the significance of these human capital effects by using the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance longitudinal surveys.
We contribute to the existing literature in several ways. Previous studies on the determinants of firm innovation in transition economies of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union analyze various firm characteristics that impact innovation but leave the role of human capital unexplained. For example, Grosfeld-Tressel (2001) , Carlin et al. (2001) , and Aghion et al. (2002) focus on the effect of competition on firm innovation. Volchkova (1998) , Carlin et al. (2001) , Jefferson et al (2002) and Guriev-Rachinsky (2004) study the effect of ownership structure on innovation. Guriev et al. (2003) study the effect of corporate governance and quality of management on the ability to innovate. We extend the literature by estimating the causal effect of on-the-job-training and university education on the firm's decision to innovate. We use longitudinal data, which includes information on firm characteristics and innovation decisions from 25 transition economies. Our estimation technique controls for both country and firm level random effects in the model.
In addition to incorporating these additional human capital effects, we examine a new measure of innovation. Specifically, we try to capture not only the degree to which firms in transition economies are adapting technology, but also the degree to which firms promote knowledge transfers. Thus, along with core innovation activities such as introducing/upgrading product lines and services (Carlin et al. 2004 , Branstetter et al. 2008 , Gorodnichenko et al. 2008 , we use additional forms of innovation activities such as signing new licensing agreements and obtaining new quality accreditations.
It is worthwhile to note that eight transition economies became members of the EU in 2004. As our dataset contains information on firms' innovation decisions before and after 2004 4 , this structural break provides us an additional exogenous variation in the model, which helps us to identify the causal effect of human capital on innovation. It also enables us to compare innovation prevalence of the firms from the new EU countries with innovation prevalence of the firms from the Former Soviet Union and the rest of Eastern European countries before and after the EU membership.
Our findings, based on a mixed discrete-continuous model with endogenous variables in the firm's innovation equation, provide results contrary to the OECD recommendation of increasing spending on formal education in order to enact innovation improvements. In particular, we show that further investments in education will not lead to necessary improvements in the firm's demonstrated ability to innovate. Instead, on-the-job-training plays a fundamental role (although lesser in Eastern Europe) in increasing this ability. We also find that EU membership does not significantly affect innovation. This paper is structured as follows. The next section provides the theoretical model of the innovation tradeoff. Section 3 presents the estimation techniques used in this study. Section 4 presents the data. The main empirical findings and results from policy simulation are discussed in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
Theoretical Model of the Innovation Tradeoff
In a simplified model, we explore the innovation tradeoff faced by firms by assuming that they compete over a finite set of differentiated, non-complementary products. We assume a single product. A pool of competitive "innovators" of human capital quality, , exists for the product.
Each firm can choose to innovate by investing in an innovator at cost , where is a vector of firm, industry and country characteristics. Human capital quality is the combination of both general (education) and specific human capital (on-the-job training) of workers. If human capital in the innovation decision of firms in countries with transition economies is mainly related to absorptive capacity of workers to use new technology, then an increase in specific human capital through on-the-job training increases cost of innovation through training cost,
. At the same time, an increase in general human capital (education) also increases the cost of innovation either through tuition cost or through hiring cost of more educated workers, . Finally, an increase in the quality of human capital through on-the-job training or general training results in an increase in the likelihood of successful innovation,
5
, where , as goes to infinity and , 6 .
In this simple model if the firm does not innovate, we normalize its expected profit to zero. If more than one firm innovates, all firms receive zero revenue, which is interpreted as the Bertrand outcome for the innovative firms, and the out-of-market outcome for non-innovative firms. For the purpose of this exposition, we assume that firms are identical in their innovation technologies.
We also assume the revenue streams for the innovated and non-innovated goods both experience independent identically distributed development shocks with mean zero and variance V .
With these assumptions and firms, the expected profit of any firm is:
( 1) where is the decision to innovate by incurring the cost, .
Based on the above, the firm's decision rule can be formulated as:
Using the decision rule we can specify the probability of the firm's being involved in an innovative activity as:
where ) is a cumulative distribution function.
The theoretical association of interest between human capital and the firm's innovation decision can be deduced from equation (3). In particular, direct comparative static analysis shows that the effect of the quality of human capital, through increase in specific or general training on the probability of innovation, is ambiguous.
(4) The above comparative analysis demonstrates that an increase in human capital quality positively affects the probability of successful innovation but at the same time it increases the cost of innovation regardless of the type of training. In the empirical part of the paper we would like to estimate the exact sign of the effect of human capital quality represented by share of workers with university education in the firm and the provision of on-the-job training. Our main goal is to learn whether higher quality of human capital induces firms to innovate more and which form of human capital, general or specific, is an important part of the decision making process.
We have to note that the theoretical model presented above is a very simplified version of the innovation tradeoff faced by firms and does not account for simultaneity of the innovation and human capital development decisions. The simultaneity issue cannot be straightforwardly incorporated within the static framework. For example, the current period on-the-job training decision affects future worker and firm productivity and such analysis should be performed in a dynamic setting. While highly simplified, this model demonstrates a fundamental tradeoff faced by firms. As the level of skill required innovating a particular product increases, the costs of attempting innovation might exceed its potential benefits.
Empirical Model and Estimation Techniques
The empirical specification of the relationship between human capital quality and innovation decision for firm in country in period can be derived by linearly approximating the decision rule in (2) where firm's decision to innovate is a function of firm and country level characteristics and human capital quality . The former includes and each element of this vector will be discussed in details below.
(5)
In the above, specification is a vector of variables characterizing different aspects of the firm's financing and competition environment. In particular, vector includes whether the firm has a bank loan or overdraft, fraction of firm's sales that are exported, fraction of margin by which firm's sales price exceeds its operation costs, whether the firm is a large or medium sized firm, and whether the firm feels any pressure from foreign competitors.
Firms across industries differ by composition of workforce in terms of the average educational attainment of workers. Moreover, firms across industries have different propensities to being involved in any innovative activity. To address this concern, in we also add a set of industry dummies to control for the industry fixed effect.
In this study we are using firm level data across 25 transition countries of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Though all these countries are transitioning from a centrally planned economy to a market based economy, we believe there exists some country specific heterogeneity across these countries that may affect the firm's innovation decision. For example, in some countries the macroeconomic conditions are more favorable for innovation, such as laws that allure more direct foreign investment. Furthermore, the same country specific factors may affect human capital quality within firms and the failure to address this issue would lead to unreliable point estimates. To control for the country specific factors, we include a variety of variables in vector P such as the unemployment rate, net flow of foreign direct investment and gross domestic product per capita in a given country and year. However, we also recognize that the inclusion in vector P of the above country specific variables does not guarantee us the full control for all country specific factors, which may correlate with quality of human capital. Therefore, in the innovation equation we capture the rest of country specific factors that affect the firm's innovation decision and correlate with quality of human capital in .
Finally the important component of equation (5) is firm specific unobserved heterogeneity . It is well documented in the literature that an essential part of successful innovation is having a competent managerial cadre with the appropriate incentives and tools. For instance, the lack of quality managerial capacity or "entrepreneurship" can constrain the firm's investment in advanced technology, as it reduces the firm's information on the most appropriate technology. In other words, firms with better managers may be more likely to adopt technology, hire a larger share of university-educated workers, and train their employees. Thus, the effect of the share of university-educated workers and the provision of training for employees may simply reflect omitted managerial or other firm characteristics. One of the possible strategies to address this problem is the inclusion of firm-level controls in the innovation equation. However, even using the rich set of firm specific characteristics we must acknowledge that our findings could still be partly driven by unobservable firm characteristics. In we recognize these unobservable firm characteristics as .
To estimate consistently parameters of the innovation equation given in (5), we have to additionally recognize and control endogeneity of human capital quality in the latter equation.
The endogeneity problem arises due to the correlation of human capital quality with unobserved country and firm specific unobserved heterogeneity, and . To control for endogeneity of human capital quality in the innovation equation, we additionally model the firm's hiring university-educated employees (or higher) and on-the-job-training decisions. These equations are given in (6) and (7), respectively.
(6) (7)
In equation (6), which models firm's located in country in period hiring decision of university educated workers, the dependent variable is measured by the fraction of workers with some university education or higher. Because of the continuous dependent variable, equation (6) is represented by linear equation in our model. In the data, the dependent variable of equation (7) is observed both in the discrete and continuous form. In particular, the managers of each firm provided information regarding whether the firm offered formal training to its skilled workers in the last 12 months and, if the firm did, the share of skilled workers that received formal training. Hence, the on-the-job training decision enters into the empirical model as linear equation if it is measured continuously, and as the limited dependent variable equation in (7') otherwise.
The fact of availability of both forms of an on-the-job training measure allows us to check whether the effect of human capital is sensitive to the specification of on-the-job training in the empirical model.
In both equations as controls we use the same set of independent variables as in equation (5). However, to identify the effects of human capital quality in the innovation equation, we include several variables in vector that indirectly impact the likelihood of innovation through general or specific training. In other words, we believe that the set of variables in induces some firms to change their innovation status only through the quality of human capital.
In vector , we include country and time specific variables, such as the fraction of workforce with tertiary education, and the share of education and training expenditure in GDP in a given country and year. The use of country or regional level external variables as exclusion restrictions in studying a variety of causal relationships in the firm's production process is a common practice in the literature. For example, Ospina and Schiffbauer (2006) use the country-level index on the costs of starting a business to identify the effect of competition on the firm's productivity. In addition, we also use an internal variable as an exclusion restriction. In particular, we use firm level information on the duration of filling in the most recent vacancy requiring a high-skilled worker 7 .
7 One may speculate that this variable correlates with firm and country unobserved heterogeneity. To check that this is not the case, we use as an exclusion restriction, along with other country level restrictions, the industry-countrytime averaged duration of filling in a high skilled vacancy, computed for each firm. The estimates and standard errors change only marginally compared with the estimates and standard errors received using the firm-level duration of filling in a high skilled vacancy.
There are two main criteria that exclusion restrictions must pass in order to be valid exclusion restrictions and help to identify the causal effect of the interest of this study. First, the exclusion restrictions should correlate with endogenous variables, in our case with the share of university education and provision of on-the-job training in the firm. Both country level exclusion restrictions specifically measure the quality of human capital in a given country. Intuitively, the quality of human capital in the country should positively correlate with the quality of human capital of the average firm located in this country. Furthermore, our firm level exclusion restriction associates with the availability of skilled workers in the local market. If there is a short supply of skilled workers in the local market, then the firm would more likely to hire a less educated worker for this position and provide intensive on-the-job training in order to bring the quality of human capital of the new worker to the average level required at this position. The second criterion is that the exclusion restrictions should affect the firm's innovation decision only through the quality of human capital. Using the same logic, we can speculate that our exclusion restrictions do not directly correlate with the firm's prevalence of innovation. Certainly, this could be not enough to defend our choice of exclusion restrictions. Therefore, we perform a series of identification tests to provide statistical evidence of the validity of our exclusion restrictions. We discuss the results of the tests in the Results section of the paper.
To estimate the mixed discrete-continuous model with endogenous variables (quality of human capital) in the innovation equation we simultaneously estimate equations 5, 6 and 7. We assume 's and 's correlates across equations.
The estimation strategy used in this paper is proposed by Mroz (1999) and known in the literature as a discrete factor method. The method assumes that there are M and K points of support to approximate the joint distributions of and . Conditional on mass point and 8 , firm i from country j has the following contribution to the likelihood function 9 :
(8) The unconditional contribution for firm i from country j is: (9) Finally, the likelihood function can now be written as follows: 8 There are three equations in the model, therefore, w m and v k consist of three vectors each representing the set of heterogeneity parameters in one of the equations. 9 If equation (7) is modeled by the linear equation with the dependent variable "share of skilled workers who received on-the-job training," in the second row of the likelihood function the second and third terms are substituted by density function . Also, in the first term of the second row will be .
(10)
We also assume the logistic distribution for the firm development shocks in equations (5) and (7'). This implies that these equations enter as logits in the system of equations. Furthermore, the discrete factor method assumes that firm and country level disturbances are not normally distributed. The credibility of these assumptions cannot be directly tested, because in reality we do not observe the true distributions of these unobserved factors. The alternative method can be the imposition of multivariate normality. However, when the disturbances are not normally distributed (the latter is not directly testable either), the discrete factor method performs better than the method assuming joint normality (Mroz, 1999) .
The likelihood function is maximized with respect to all parameters in equations 5, 6, and 7 as well as the country and individual's specific mass points and weights. In each equation, we also include a constant term and normalize one country and individual mass point per equation to zero to identify the model. The model is estimated using FORTRAN with the GQOPT optimization library.
Data
The data used are from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS), which is a joint initiative of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank Group. For each survey, the samples were structured to be representative of the domestic economies, with specific quotas placed on firm size, sector, location, and export orientation. The samples were heavily weighted toward privately-owned firms, but minimum quotas were used to ensure some representation of state-owned firms and firms with foreign ownership. The surveys placed particular emphasis on the extent and nature of firms' business activities, including questions on innovative activities, local and national competition, and state intervention in firm decisionmaking. In addition, the datasets contain a panel component, where 1,399 firms (excluding firms from Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkmenistan 11 ) that were surveyed in 2002 were surveyed again in 2005. As a result, the BEEPS surveys provide a unique opportunity to compare factors that influence innovation for firms across transition countries and also across firms with different characteristics within a given country.
Our definitions of innovation include not only the core innovation activity such as upgrading product lines and services, but also other types of activities that promote knowledge transfers such as signing new licensing agreements, and obtaining new quality accreditations. These three variables we use as dependent variables in the empirical part of the paper.
Definitions of all firm-level variables are provided in Table 1 . Also note from Table 2 that the average unemployment rate in countries with transition economies is 10.7 percent with the highest rate equal to 37 percent. Average gross domestic product per capita is USD 892 with standard deviation close to USD 70. This fact points out that there is not much variation in gross domestic product per capita across 25 countries in our sample. However, Table 2 shows substantial variations across countries in the proportion of labor force with tertiary education (mean -26.5%, st. dev. -16%), expenditure on education in GDP (mean -4.47%, st. dev. 1.29%), and the average time to fill in the most recent vacancy for a skilled worker (mean -2 weeks, st. dev. -1.14 weeks). The substantial variations in these instrumental variables identify the causal effect of human capital on the propensity to innovate in our study.
For the identification purpose of the dynamic model, the data should provide ample evidence that firms change innovation decisions between two periods. activity is less pronounced compared with the product licensing agreement but is still substantial and in the range of almost 45 percent. All these facts are in favor of our dynamic model.
Results
Partial results from the joint estimation of the firm's innovation, hires of university educated workers and on-the-job training decisions are reported in Table 4 . In the first two models we use on-the-job training in discrete form. The difference between Model 1 and Model 2 is that Model 1 does not account for any firm and country level unobserved heterogeneity, whereas Model 2 controls for them. In Model 3 and Model 4, we use the continuous measure for on-the-job training. In Model 3 we do not control for any unobserved heterogeneity, whereas in Model 4 we do. It should be noted that in Table 4 , we report only estimates for human capital and country membership parameters from the innovation equation and values of the log likelihood function for the whole model. The latter statistics we include for the purpose of testing. We do not report any results for other estimates in Table 4 . However, for those who could be interested in all estimates we report them separately in Appendix 1.
The results for Models 1 and 3 in Table 4 suggest that there is a robustly positive relationship between measures of human capital and prevalence to innovate regardless of whether on-the-job training is measured continuously or discretely. Viewed together, the results support the importance of both human capital measures on firm innovation. However, these models do not consider possible correlations between quality of human capital and firm and country unobserved characteristics in the innovation equations 13 . We believe that the method employed in the estimation of Model 2 and Model 4 adequately accounts for these factors and identifies the causal effects of university education and on-the-job-training on innovation.
Before discussing the results of Model 2 and Model 4, we would like to provide evidence that models with unobserved heterogeneity are more favorable than the simpler models. The values of the log likelihood function are significantly improved with the estimation of additional unobserved heterogeneity parameters. In many cases, the value of the log likelihood function increases by more than 450 points. Taking into consideration that there are only 8 additional unobserved heterogeneity parameters to estimate (assuming 2 firm and 2 country mass points), improvements in the values of the log likelihood function can be considered as being highly significant.
With regard to the results of Model 2 and Model 4, first, we want to point out that only in the case of upgrading a product line or service, a negative and statistically significant effect has been detected for the Country is EU member state parameter in Model 4. We have two reasons to believe why this might be the case in new EU countries for this specific innovation activity. First, membership in the EU had adversely affected those sectors of the economy that previously enjoyed protection from formal and informal barriers to trade. Upon accession to EU, countries had to refrain from all subsidies that were incompatible with the common market, which, in turn, might have led to a reduction in innovation among firms. Second, the gains from the EU accession accrued predominantly to highly skilled labor, which was able to move to countries offering the highest returns. This might have led to reduction in the human capital endowment of the countries of origin and negatively affected the innovation propensities of firms.
However, the most important result in Table 4 is that the coefficients on the share of university education variable are no longer statistically significant at the 10% level for all innovation activities, although they continue to be positive. The absence of any effect on university education in the innovation equation suggests that general training is not a driving force of innovation. This is not a very surprising result. Innovation in transition economies is mostly related to absorbing new technology but not to inventing it. Therefore, adopting new technology requires the firm to employ workers with technical degrees who would need only some specific training.
The result for the on-the-job training parameter in the innovation equation supports the above argument. In contrast to a university education, on-the-job training remains to be positive and strongly significant in the innovation equation after controlling for firm and country unobserved heterogeneity. As discussed above, the positive effect of on-the-job training in the innovation equation seems intuitive, since employers use on-the-job-training as one of the possible means of coping with changes fostered by technological innovation.
Though results from Model 2 and Model 4 provide identical conclusions on the effect of human capital quality on innovation, for the purpose of exposition, the identification testing, additional specifications and policy simulation analysis are performed with only the continuous measure of on-the-job training.
Based on the likelihood ratio test we receive evidence that our exclusion restrictions pass validity and relevance criteria. If the exclusion restrictions are relevant, then they must strongly, rather than weakly, correlate with the measures of quality of human capital. We use the likelihood ratio test to test the joint significance of the exclusion restrictions in university education and on-thejob training equations. The results of the test (statistics and p-values) are in the first three rows of Table 5 . The p-values suggest that one would fail to reject the hypothesis of joint significance of the exclusion restrictions in both equations. For the exclusion restrictions to pass validity criterion, the restrictions should not correlate with the firm's innovation decision. To perform the latter test, we include exclusion restrictions in the innovation equation and a re-estimated Model 4. The last three rows of Table 5 provide evidence that these restrictions do not jointly correlate with the firm's innovation decision.
In Table 6 , we report results for the model in which we allow interaction terms between country membership dummies and human capital variables (on-the-job training is in the continuous form). Table 6 demonstrates that interactions of the EU indicator with human capital variables are not significant in any innovation specification. We can speculate that the non-significance of these interaction terms can be explained by the gradual integration of the EE countries into the EU, and thus the competitive conditions did not significantly change upon formal accession. Interestingly, in two out of three cases the Skilled worker training --Eastern European Country interaction is negative and significant (it is positive only in the case of obtaining a new quality accreditation, although statistically insignificant). These results suggest that on-the-job-training is a less important determinant of firm innovation in the EE countries compared with the postSoviet Union countries.
To understand if a change in overall higher educational attainment in the country leads to a change in the likelihood of firm innovation, we conducted a policy simulation analysis. In particular, we increased the fraction of the labor force with tertiary education in all countries by 5 percentage points. In the simulation program, we assume that the entire set of estimated coefficients, mass points and mass point probabilities follow a multivariate normal distribution centered at the estimated values of the parameters with covariance matrix equal to the estimated covariance matrix for the entire set of parameters. To conduct the simulation exercise, we draw a set of normally distributed random variables from this distribution and recalculate the outcomes of the model with perturbed parameters. The above step was reiterated 250 times.
The results of the simulation analysis are shown in Table 7 . An exogenous increase in the stock of general human capital in the whole country leads to the lower probability of any innovation activity by firms in transition economies, although all results are not statistically significant. For example, a 5 percentage point increase in the proportion of workers with tertiary education leads to only a 0.03 percent decrease in the likelihood that an average firm will obtain a new product licensing agreement, to a 0.09-0.11 percent decrease in the likelihood that it will obtain a new quality accreditation and finally, to a 0.15-0.16 percent decrease in the likelihood that it will upgrade existing product lines/services.
We can explain unresponsiveness of innovation to the exogenous increase in the stock of general human capital in the countries with transition economies by the tradeoff faced by the firm between the options whether to hire university educated workers or to provide on-the-job training to the existing pool of skilled workers. The simulation analysis demonstrates that on one hand, the exogenous increase in the fraction of workers with a university education in the country unambiguously increases the share of workers with university education in the firm (panel B of Table 7 ). On the other hand, such an increase decreases the fraction of skilled workers to whom on-the-job training would be offered and provided (panel C of Table 7 ). Based on the numbers reported in the two last panels of Table 7 , we can speculate that, in countries with transition economies, university education and on-the-job training could be good substitutes in firms' innovation decisions. What is obvious is that a good estimate for the university education/on-the-job training elasticity could provide helpful information for policymakers in these countries.
Conclusion
Using firm level data for 1399 firms in 25 transition countries, this study examines the determinants of firm innovation amongst firms in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. We used the 2002 and 2005 waves of the BEEPS, which identify technological and innovation activities as well as information on internal factors such as workforce education and training, firm size, export orientation, market concentration, foreign competition and formal external financing. The longitudinal aspect of the BEEPS allowed us to control for firm and country specific factors using a novel econometric technique. Our main conclusion is based on the mixed discrete-continuous model, which controls for endogeneity of on-the-job-training and university education in the innovation equation. In particular, we conclude that training provided by firms rather than formal higher education is the driving force of innovation in transition economies. However, the effect is substantially lower for firms from Eastern European countries. The results also suggest that the effect has not changed much with the accession of countries in the European Union. The simulation analysis shows that an increase in the fraction of labor force with tertiary education in a given country does not translate into a significant increase in participation in the majority of innovation activities.
We believe that the findings of this study have public policy implications for countries with transition economies. In particular, our main findings shed light on how local authorities may allocate scarce resources if the main goal of authorities is to boost innovation activities in their countries. Our results show that an increase in spending on higher education is not the best option. Instead, a variety of public-private co-investments in worker training programs is a possible solution. Average time (in weeks) it takes to fill in the most recent vacancy for a skilled worker in a given country, industry and year , and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. # of countries is 25, # of firms is 294, # of periods is 2, # of observations is 2798, # of firm specific mass points is 2, # of country specific mass points is 2 1 All models are estimated with two exclusion restrictions: the fraction of workforce with tertiary education, and the share of education expenditure in GDP in a given country and year. 2 All models are estimated with two exclusion restrictions: the average duration of filling a high-skilled vacancy in a given firm, country and year, and the fraction of workforce with tertiary education. 3 All models are estimated with three exclusion restrictions: the average duration of filling a high-skilled vacancy in a given firm, country and year, the fraction of workforce with tertiary education, and the share of education expenditure in GDP in a given country and year. , and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. # of countries is 25, # of firms is 294, # of periods is 2, # of observations is 2798, # of firm specific mass points is 2, # of country specific mass points is 2 1 A model is estimated with two exclusion restrictions (the fraction of workforce with tertiary education, and the share of education expenditure in GDP in a given country and year). In addition each restriction is interacted also with each country membership variables in university education and on-the-job training equations. The total number of exclusion restrictions is 12. 2 A model is estimated with two exclusion restrictions (the average duration of filling a high-skilled vacancy in a given firm, country and year, and the fraction of workforce with tertiary education). In addition each restriction is interacted also with each country membership variables in university education and on-the-job training equations. The total number of exclusion restrictions is 12. 3 A model is estimated with three exclusion restrictions (the average duration of filling a high-skilled vacancy in a given firm, country and year, the fraction of workforce with tertiary education, and the share of education expenditure in GDP in a given country and year). In addition each restriction is interacted also with each country membership variables in university education and on-the-job training equations. The total number of exclusion restrictions is 16. 
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